The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
1. Is it appropriate to attribute predestination to God?
2. What is predestination, and does it introduce anything real into the predestined?
3. Does the disapproval of certain men come from God?
4. Comparison between predestination and election; can we say that the predestined are chosen?
5. Are merits the cause or reason of predestination, or of reprobation, as well as of election?
6. Certainty of predestination: are the predestined infallibly saved?
7. Is the number of the predestined fixed?
8. Can predestination be aided by the prayers of the saints?
Article 1 - Is it appropriate to attribute predestination to God?
Objections:
1 . It seems that men are not predestined by God. Indeed, S. John
Damascene writes: “You must know that God foresees everything, but does not predetermine everything. He foresees what is in us, but he does not predetermine it. “Now, human merits or demerits are in us, insofar as we are masters of our actions by free will. Therefore what is an object of merit or demerit is not predestined by God, and thus the predestination of men disappears.
2 . It has just been said that all creatures are directed towards their end by divine providence. But creatures other than man are not said to be predestined by God. So neither do men.
3 . Angels are capable of beatitude like men, and yet it does not seem that they are predestined, because they have never been miserable, whereas predestination is a project of mercy, according to S. Augustine. So men are not predestined.
4 . The benefits granted to men by God are revealed to the saints by the Holy Spirit, according to the Apostle (1 Cor 2:12): “We have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who comes from God , to know the gracious gifts that God has given us. ”So, if men were predestined by God, the predestined would know their predestination. Which is obviously false.
On the contrary , we read in the Epistle to the Romans (8:30): “Those whom he predestined, he also called. "
Answer :
It is fitting that God predestined men. Indeed, all things are subject to divine providence, as has been shown. And it is up to providence to order things to their end. Now the end to which God orders his creatures is twofold. One exceeds the measure and power of created nature, and this end is eternal life, which consists of divine vision, which surpasses the nature of every creature, as has been shown above. The other end is proportionate to the created nature, such that the creature can attain it through the resources of its nature. Now, what one cannot achieve by the resources of one's nature, one must be carried there by another: thus the arrow is launched towards the target by the archer. This is why, strictly speaking, the rational creature, who is capable of eternal life, is led there and as if transported by God. And the plan for this divine action exists in God, just as there is in him the plan for the ordination of all things to their end, which we have called providence. Now the idea of a thing to do exists in the mind of its author and it is a sort of pre-existence in him of this thing to do. Also the project of leading the rational creature to eternal life is called “predestination”, because “destining” is the same thing as “sending”. It is evident from this that predestination, as to its object, is a part of providence.
Solutions:
1. John Damascene calls predestination an imposed necessity as is the case with things in nature, which are predetermined to act in a single way. This is evident from what he says next: “God does not will sin and does not compel virtue. ”So this does not exclude predestination.
2. Creatures without reason are not capable of this end of which we speak and which exceeds the faculties of human nature. This is why we cannot, strictly speaking, call them predestined, although sometimes this term is improperly extended to any other end.
3. Predestination suits angels as well as men, although they have never been miserable. The movement is not specified by the term from which it starts, but by the term to which it tends. It matters nothing to “becoming white” whether the person who becomes white was previously black, yellow or red. Likewise, it matters nothing to the formal reason for predestination whether one is predestined to eternal life from a state of misery, or not. We could also respond that any grant of good in excess of what is due to its beneficiary is an effect of mercy, as was said above.
4. Even if their predestination is revealed to some men by special privilege, it is not proper that it should be revealed to all; because in this case the non-predestined would fall into despair and the predestined, thus reassured, into negligence.
Article 2 - What is predestination, and does it introduce something real into the predestined?
Objections:
1. It seems that predestination introduces something real into the predestined. Because, of itself, every action produces a passion. Therefore, if predestination is an action in God, it exists, as a passion, among the predestined.
2 . On the Epistle to the Romans (1.4): “(Jesus) predestined Son of God”, Origen says: “Predestination concerns what is not, but destination concerns what is. ” S. Augustine asks: “What is predestination, if not the destination of someone who exists? ”So predestination concerns an existing being, and it introduces something into the predestined.
3 . Being prepared is something real in what is prepared. Now predestination, says S. Augustine, is the preparation of divine benefits. It is therefore something real in the predestined.
4 . What is temporal does not enter into the definition of the eternal. But grace, which is a temporal reality, enters into the definition of predestination. For this, according to the Book of Sentences, is defined as “the preparation of grace for the present, and of glory for the future.” So predestination is not something eternal. Therefore it must not exist in God, but in the predestined, because everything that is in God is eternal.
In the opposite sense , S. Augustine calls predestination “the foreknowledge of the benefits of God”. Now the foreknowledge is not in those who are the objects of it, but only in the one who has the foreknowledge. Therefore predestination is also not in the predestined, but in the one who predestinates.
Answer :
Predestination is not something in the predestined, but only in the one who predestinates. In fact, we have just said that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not in the things it concerns, it is a certain plan of the intelligence which orders the end, as was said previously. But the realization of providence, which we call government, is found as passion in the beings governed, and as action in the one who governs. It is clear, then, that predestination is a certain plan, conceived in the divine mind, for the ordination of some to eternal salvation. It is the realization of this ordination which is found passively in the predestined, and actively in God. The realization of predestination is first vocation, then glorification, according to these words of the Apostle (Rm 8:30): “Those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he he called...he glorified them. ”
Solutions:
1 . Actions which pass into an external matter, such as heating or sawing, produce a passion of themselves, but not actions which remain in the agent, such as intellection and willing, as we have said. Now predestination is an action of this kind. Also it introduces nothing real into the predestined. But its realization, which concerns external things, introduces a certain effect into these things.
2 . “Destination” can be taken as a real sending of the subject towards a certain term, and thus the destination only concerns what exists. In another sense, we can understand by “destination” a mentally envisaged “sending”, and we use destinare for a firm resolution. Thus in book II of Maccabees (6, 20, Vg), we read that Eleazar “decided (destinavit) not to accept, for love of life, foods prohibited by the Law”. In this sense, “destination” can be about what does not exist. However, predestination, because it implies anteriority, can concern what does not exist, in whatever sense we take the word destination.
3 . There are two kinds of preparation. The patient can be prepared to receive the action, and this preparation is in the prepared subject. But there is also the preparation of the agent to act, and this remains in the agent. Now it is of this matter that predestination is a preparation, in the sense that we say that he who acts by intelligence prepares himself for action by first conceiving what he must do. And thus God, eternally, prepared by predestining, that is to say, he conceived the plan which ordains certain men to salvation.
4. Grace enters into the definition of predestination, not as an element of its essence, but insofar as predestination involves a relationship with grace, which is a relationship of cause and effect, or even of act to object. It does not therefore follow that predestination is something temporal.
Article 3 - Does the disapproval of certain men come from God?
Objection:
1. It seems that God reproaches no man. For no one reproaches the one he loves, according to the book of Wisdom (11, 24): “You love everything that exists, and you hate nothing that you have done. ”So God does not reprove any man.
2 . If God reproved certain men, reprobation would have to be to the reprobate what predestination is to the predestined. But predestination is for the predestined a cause of salvation; reprobation would therefore be a cause of perdition for the reprobate. But this is false; for the prophet Hosea (13, 9 Vg) said: “Your perdition comes from you, Israel, from me only comes your help. “So God does not reprove anyone.
3 . Moreover, we must not impute to anyone what he cannot avoid. But if God reproaches someone, that reprobate cannot avoid his ruin; for it is written in Ecclesiastes (7:13 Vg): “Look at the work of God: no one will be able to right what he has despised. ” Therefore, men should not be blamed for their own perdition, and this is false.
In the opposite sense , we find in Malachi (1, 23): “I have loved Jacob; but I hated Esau.”
Answer:
God reproaches some. In fact, it was said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now it is up to providence to allow some failure in the things subject to it, as was said previously. Also, since men are ordained to eternal life by divine providence, it also belongs to providence to allow some to miss this end, and this is what we call reprobation.
Therefore, just as predestination is a part of providence towards those who are ordained by God to eternal salvation, so reprobation in turn is a part of providence towards those who miss this end. From which we see that reprobation does not designate simple prescience; she adds something to it according to the consideration of reason, as was said above of providence. For just as predestination includes the will to bestow grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will to allow such a man to fall into sin, and to inflict the penalty of damnation for that sin.
Solutions:
1. God loves all men and even all his creatures, in the sense that he wants good for all. But he doesn't want everything well for everyone. Therefore, insofar as he does not want for some this good which is eternal life, we say that he hates them or that he reproaches them.
2 . From the point of view of causality, reprobation is not comparable to predestination. For predestination is the cause both of what the predestined expect in the other life, which is glory, and of what they receive in this one, which is grace. Reprobation is not the cause of what corresponds to it in the present, namely fault; it is the cause of abandonment by God. But it is the cause of the future sanction, namely eternal punishment. The fault comes from the free will of the one who is reprobate and whom grace abandons. And thus the words of the prophet are verified: “Your perdition comes from you, Israel. ”
3 . The reprobation of God in no way diminishes the power of the reprobate to act. Also, when we say that the reprobate cannot obtain grace, we must understand it as not an absolute impossibility, but a conditioned one; as we said above that, if it is necessary for the predestined to be saved, it is from a conditioned necessity, which does not suppress free will. Also, although the man reprobate by God cannot obtain grace, nevertheless, the fact that he falls into this sin or another, this comes from his free will, and it is therefore rightly that he is found guilty.
Article 4 — Can we say that the predestined are elected?
Objections:
1 . It seems not, because according to Dionysius, as the sun spreads its light on all bodies, without choosing, so God spreads his goodness. But it is mainly according to the communication of grace and glory that divine goodness is communicated to a few. Therefore, it is without choosing that God communicates grace and glory, which is the fact of predestination.
2 . The election concerns existing ones; but predestination, being eternal, also concerns non-existents. So some are predestined without being elected.
3 . The election involves a certain discrimination. But “God wants all men to be saved” (1 Tim 2:4). Therefore predestination, which preordains men to salvation, excludes choice.
On the contrary , we read in the epistle to the Ephesians (1, 4): “He chose us in himself before the creation of the world. "
Answer :
Predestination, according to the rational order, presupposes election, and election, love. This is because predestination, as has been said, is part of providence. Now providence, like prudence, is a plan existing in the intelligence, which prescribes the ordination of certain people to their end, as we said previously. Now we do not decide to order something to an end, if we do not first want this end. Also the predestination of some to salvation presupposes, according to reason, that God wills their salvation, and this includes election and the love of dilection. This one, insofar as he wants for them this good of eternal salvation, because to love, as we have said, is to want a certain goodness for someone. And predestination supposes election, insofar as God wants this good for some in preference to others, since he reproves some, as we have said.
However, election and love do not have an identical order in God and in us. In us, the will does not make the one it loves good, but we are inclined to love him because he is good. This is why we choose someone to love, so that in us choice precedes love. In God it is the opposite, because the will by which God wishes goodness for someone by loving him is the cause of this one rather than others being good for this goodness. From which we see that according to the rational order, love is presupposed to election, the latter to predestination. This is why all the predestined are chosen and loved.
Solutions:
1 . If we consider in general the communication of divine goodness, God communicates it in fact without choice, in the sense that there is nothing that does not participate in this goodness in some way as we saw previously. But if we consider the communication of this or that goodness, God does not give it without choice since he gives good things to some which he does not give to others. And so, in the bestowal of grace and glory, there is election.
2 . When the will of the one who chooses is called to this choice by a pre-existing good in the thing, then the choice must be made on beings which exist, and this is what takes place for us. But in God it is otherwise, as we have just said. Also, declares St. Augustine, “although God chooses those who are not, he is not mistaken in his choices.”
3 . God wants the salvation of all men, as we have already seen, by his antecedent will, which is not willing purely and simply; he doesn't want it, all things considered, that is to say, purely and simply.
Article 5 - Are merits the cause or reason of predestination, or of reprobation, as well as of election?
Objection:
1. It seems that the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination, for Paul writes (Rom 8:29): “Those whom he foreknew he predestined. ” And on the words of S. Paul (Rm 9, 15), “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy”, S. Ambrose gives this comment: “I will have mercy on him whom I know in advance must return to me with all his heart. ”So, it seems that the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
2 . Predestination supposes the divine will, which cannot be irrational, since predestination is the resolution to show mercy, according to S. Augustine. But there cannot be any other reason for predestination than the anticipation of merits. So this prediction is the cause or reason for predestination.
3 . “There is no injustice in God,” says the epistle to the Romans (9:14). But it seems unfair to give unequal things to equals. All men are equal, both in nature and according to original sin; we find inequality in them only according to the merit or demerit of their own actions. Therefore if God prepares unequal fates for men, by predestining or reproving them, it can only be because of the foreknowledge he has of their different merits.
On the contrary , the Apostle says to Titus (3:5): “He saved us, not because of the works of justice that we did, but according to his mercy. ” Now just as he saved us, so he predestined us to be saved. Therefore the prediction of merits is not the reason or cause of predestination.
Answer:
We said above, predestination includes a will, and we must therefore seek the reason for predestination as we seek that of the divine will. Now we have said that we cannot assign a cause to the divine will with regard to the act of willing, but that we can assign to it a cause with regard to the things willed, insofar as God wills that one thing is because of another. No one has therefore been foolish enough to say that merits were the cause of predestination with regard to the very act of the one who predestines. But here is what is in question: In terms of its effects, does predestination have a cause? And this is to ask: Did God foreordain that he would give to a being the effects of predestination because of his merits?
So some have said: The effect of predestination is foreordained in favor of a being because of the merits of that being in his previous life. This was the position of Origen, for whom human souls, all created at the beginning, obtain according to the diversity of their works various fates in this world, once united with their body. But the Apostle rejects this opinion by saying (Rm 9, 1113): “Even before the children were born and had done anything, neither good nor bad,... not by virtue of works, but by choice of Him who calls, it was said: ...The elder shall serve the younger. ”
This is why others have said that pre-existing merits, but this time in this life, are the reason and cause of the effects of predestination. Indeed the Pelagians claimed that the beginning of good works comes from us, and that their completion comes from God. And so the effect of predestination is given to one and not to another, because one has provided the beginning by preparing himself, and the other has not. But on the contrary there are these words of the Apostle (2 Cor 3, 5 Vg): “We are not capable of thinking anything that comes from ourselves. ” Now, we cannot find any principle which is prior to thought. We cannot therefore say that there is in us a beginning providing the reason for the effects of predestination.
Also others have argued that the reason for predestination is in the merits which follow the effect of this predestination. And they understand that God gives his grace to a being and has foreordained to give him this grace, because he has foreseen that he will use it well, as if a prince gave a horse to a soldier whom he knows will use it well. will wear well. But these thinkers seem to have distinguished between what comes from grace and what comes from free will, as if the same effect could not come from both. For it is evident that what comes from grace is an effect of predestination; and this cannot be given as the reason for this predestination, since it is included in it. Therefore, if something else on our side is the cause of predestination, it will not be included in the effects of predestination. But there is no reason to distinguish in this way what comes from free will and what comes from predestination, just as the effect of the first cause and that of the second cause. Divine providence produces its effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was said above, so that the very thing that free will achieves comes from predestination.
So this must be said. The effect of predestination can be considered by us in two ways: particularly, and globally. Nothing prevents one particular effect of predestination from being the cause and motive of another. A later effect will be the cause of an earlier effect in the order of final causes; a prior effect will be the cause of a later effect in the order of merit, which can be reduced to a disposition of matter. So we can say: God has foreordained to give glory to anyone because of his merits; and he has foreordained to give grace to any one, that he may merit glory.
But if the effect of predestination is considered in another way, in its totality, it is impossible for the total effect of predestination to have any cause on our part. For whatever is found in man and ordains him to salvation, all this is understood under the effect of predestination, even preparation for grace; for this also does not take place otherwise than by divine help, according to this word of Scripture (Lm 5:21): “Make us return to you, Lord, and we will return. ” From this point of view, however, predestination, as for its effects, has as its reason divine goodness, to which the entire effect of predestination is ordered as its end, and from which it proceeds as from its first driving principle .
Solutions:
1 . The intended use of grace is not the reason why God confers this grace, except in the order of finality, as we have just said.
2 . The reason for predestination, considered in its overall effect, is divine goodness. But one particular effect is the reason for another, as we have just said.
3 . It is in divine goodness itself that we can find the reason for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others. It is said that God did everything for his goodness, so that it would be represented in things. Now it is necessary that divine goodness, one and simple in itself, be represented in things in various forms, because created being cannot attain divine simplicity. Hence it follows that for the completion of the universe various orders of things are required, some of which hold a high rank and others a tiny rank in this universe. And so that the diversity of degrees is maintained, God allows certain evils to occur, to prevent many good things from being prevented, as we said previously.
Let us therefore consider the whole human race as we do the universality of things. Among men, God wanted, for some whom he predestined, to make his goodness appear in the form of forgiving mercy; and for others whom he reproves, in the form of justice which punishes. This is why God chooses some and reproves others. It is this cause that the Apostle assigns when he says (Rom 9, 22, 23): “God, willing to manifest his wrath” (that is to say the vindictiveness of his justice) “and to make known his power , endured” (i.e. permitted) “with great patience vessels of wrath, deserving perdition, that he might shew the riches of his glory in the vessels of mercy which he hath “prepared for glory”. And elsewhere (2 Tim 2:20), the same Apostle writes: “In a large house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and earth; some for noble uses, others for vulgar uses.
But why God chooses these for glory and why he reproves these, there is no other reason than the divine will. This is what makes St. Augustine say: “Why does he attract this one and not that one? Be careful not to want to judge, if you do not want to go astray. "Thus, in nature, we can provide a reason to explain that the first matter, itself entirely uniform, is distributed partly in the form of fire, partly in the form of earth, founded by God in the beginning: c This is so that there is a diversity of species among natural things. But why one part of matter is in one form, and one part in another, depends only on the divine will. Thus it depends on the sole will of the architect that this stone is in this place of the wall, and this other elsewhere, although it is part of the plan of art that certain stones are here , and others there.
And yet, there is no injustice in God if he reserves unequal gifts for beings who are not. This would only offend the reason of justice if the effect of predestination were conferred as a due, instead of being as a grace. Where we give by grace, everyone can give as they please what they want, more or less, provided that they do not deny anyone their due; this without prejudice to justice. This is what the father of the family says in the parable (Mt 20, 14, 15): “Take what is yours and go away; am I not allowed to do with my property what I want? ”
Article 6 — The certainty of predestination — are the predestined infallibly saved?
Objection:
1. It seems that predestination is not certain. For we read in Revelation (3, 11): “Hold fast what you have, so that no one takes your crown from you. ” Whereupon S. Augustine remarks: “Another could not take her away if the first had not lost her. ”It is therefore that one can acquire and lose the crown of glory, which is the effect of predestination.
2 . A possible thing never leads to impossible consequences. Now it is possible for a predestined person, like Peter, to sin and immediately be killed. Now, in this supposition, predestination would be frustrated in its effect. So this is not impossible. So predestination is not certain.
3 . Whatever God could do, he can still do it. But God could not have predestined those he predestined. So now he may not predestinate them, and so the predestination is not certain.
Conversely , on these words of St. Paul (Rm 8:29): “Those whom he foreknew he predestined”, the Gloss writes: “Predestination is a foreknowledge and a preparation of benefits of God, through whom all who are saved are most certainly saved. ”
Answer:
Predestination very certainly and infallibly obtains its effect, without necessarily imposing a necessity for this effect such that it would necessarily occur. In fact, it was said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now not all effects subject to providence are necessary, but some are produced contingently, according to the condition of their proximate causes which divine providence has ordered to produce them. However, the order of providence is infallible, as shown above. Therefore, the order of predestination, too, is certain, and yet this does not suppress our free will, thanks to which the effect of predestination occurs contingently.
We must also think here of what was said above about divine science and also about divine will which take nothing away from contingency, although they are very certain and infallible.
Solutions:
l.The crown can belong to someone in two ways: either because of divine predestination, and thus no one loses his crown. Either because of a merit of grace, because what we deserve is in some way ours. Thus a man can lose his crown by a later mortal sin. But another receives the lost crown, in the sense that he is subsisted on the first. Indeed, God does not allow some to fall without raising up others, according to these words of Job (34, 24): “He breaks the mighty without investigation and puts others in their place. ” Thus men were substituted for the fallen angels, and the pagans for the Jews. Now he who is substituted for another in the state of grace, will receive the crown of the fallen being in that he will rejoice in eternal life in the good deeds of the good done that the other has done; for in eternal life each one will rejoice in the good deeds done not only by himself, but by others.
2 . It is undoubtedly possible, in absolute terms, for a predestined person to die in a state of mortal sin; but this is impossible if we suppose, as the objector does, that this man is predestined. It does not therefore follow that predestination is fallible.
3 . As predestination includes the divine will, what we said above namely that for God to will something created is necessary conditionally, due to the immutability of the divine will, but not absolutely, this applies to the predestination. It is therefore not necessary to say that God can not predestinate the one he has predestined, if we take this proposition in the compound sense, although, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not predestinate. But that does not take away from predestination its certainty.
Article 7 - Is the number of the predestined fixed?
Objections:
l. It seems not. Because a number that can be increased is not fixed. But we can increase the number of the predestined, it seems, since we read in Deuteronomy (1:11): “May the Lord our God add to the number many thousands! ” Commentary on the Gloss: “That is to say, the number determined with God, who knows those who belong to him. ”So the number of the predestined is not fixed.
2 . We cannot give a reason why God would predestine a greater or lesser number of men to salvation. But God does nothing without reason. Therefore the number of men who will be saved is not fixed in advance by God.
3. God's action is more perfect than that of nature. Now, in the works of nature, it is good that is most often found; fault and evil are rarer there. Therefore, if it were God who fixed the number of the elect, there would be more elect than damned, which contradicts the text of S. Matthew (7, 13-14): “Broad and spacious is the way which leads to perdition, and many are those who engage in it; narrow is the gate, and narrow is the way that leads to life, and those who find it are few. ”
On the contrary , S. Augustine writes: “The number of the predestined is fixed, and it can neither be increased nor decreased. ”
Answer:
The number of the predestined is fixed, but some have said: it is fixed as to its form, it is not as to its matter, as if we said: it is fixed that a hundred or a thousand will be saved, but not that these or those will be. But this removes the certainty of predestination, of which we have already spoken n. This is why it must be said that the number of the predestined is certain for God not only in terms of its form, but also in terms of its matter.
But it should be noted that the number of the predestined is said to be certain for God not only because of his knowledge (because he knows how many will be saved, because in this sense God is just as certain of the number of raindrops and grains of sand), but furthermore, it is certain for God because of a choice and a determination.
To be convinced of this, we must know that every agent aims at a well-defined work, as we saw above when dealing with the infinite. Now, whoever considers giving his work a certain measure projects a figure for the essential parts which are required of him for the perfection of the whole. In fact, he does not choose an absolute figure for the accessory elements: he adjusts this figure insofar as these elements are necessary for the rest. Thus the builder plans a specific size for his house, and also a specific number of rooms that he wants to have in his house, and specific measurements for the wall or the roof. But he does not choose a specific number of stones: he will take enough of them to build a wall of such dimensions.
This is how we must consider God's action with regard to the universe, which is his work. For he has determined in advance the measure which must be that of the whole universe, and what number would suit the essential parts of the universe, those which are related to its perpetuity: how many spheres, how many stars, how many of elements, how many species of beings. But corruptible individuals are ordered to the good of the universe, not primarily, but secondarily, that is to say in so far as the goodness of the species is assured by them. Without doubt God knows the number of all individuals; but the number of cows, mosquitoes, etc. is not by itself regulated in advance by God; divine providence produces them in sufficient numbers for the conservation of species.
Now, among all, rational creatures, because they are incorruptible, are ordered to contribute to the good of the universe, as principal parts and especially those which attain beatitude, because they reach more immediately the supreme end . From this it follows that for God, the number of the predestined is certain, not only as known with certainty, but also as expressly defined: it is not quite the same with regard to the number of the reprobate, who seem ordained by God for the good of the elect, since for them “everything contributes to their good.”
As for the number of all predestined men, some assure that there will be as many men saved as there were fallen angels; others, as many as angels who remained faithful; others again, as many as fallen angels and, moreover, as angels first created. But it is best to say that “the number of the elect destined to be placed in eternal happiness is known to God alone.”
Solutions:
l . This word from Deuteronomy must be understood of men whom God foreknew as righteous in this present life. Their number increases and decreases, but not that of the predestined.
2 . The quantitative measure of a part must be taken from its proportion to the whole. And this is why there is a reason for God to create so many stars, so many species of beings, to predestine so many men, according to the proportion between these principal parts and the good of the universe. .
3. The good proportionate to the common condition of nature is realized most often, and is rarely lacking. But the good which exceeds the common state of things is achieved only by a small number, and the absence of this good is frequent. Thus we see that the majority of men are endowed with sufficient knowledge for the conduct of their lives, and that those who are called idiots or insane because they lack knowledge are very few in number. But very few, among humans, are those who achieve a profound science of intelligible things. Therefore, since eternal beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, exceeds the common level of nature, especially because this nature has been deprived of grace by the corruption of original sin, there are few men saved. And in this very thing the mercy of God appears sovereignly, which elevates certain beings to a salvation that the majority lack, according to the common course and inclination of nature.
Article 8 — Can predestination be aided by the prayers of the saints?
Objections:
l . It seems not. For nothing eternal is prevented by the temporal; consequently, nothing temporal can help the existence of something eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot help one to be predestined.
2 . As no one needs advice except for lack of knowledge, so no one needs help except for lack of strength. Now neither one nor the other concerns God who predestinates, which makes the Apostle say (Rm 11:34): “Who has helped the Spirit of the Lord, or who has been his advisor? ”
3 . These are the same things that can be helped and that can be prevented. But predestination cannot be prevented by anyone. So she can't be helped by anyone.
On the contrary , we read in Genesis (25, 21): “Isaac implored God for Rebekah, his wife, and Rebekah conceived. ” Now, from this conception Jacob was born, who was predestined, and this predestination would not have been fulfilled if Jacob had not been born. So predestination is aided by the prayers of the saints.
Answer:
On this question, various errors have come to light. Some, clinging to the certainty of divine predestination, have declared prayers and likewise everything that one can do with a view to obtaining salvation superfluous, because, whether one does them or not, the predestined will obtain it, and the reprobate will not obtain it. But against this opinion are all the exhortations of Holy Scripture to prayer and other good works.
Others have claimed that through prayers one can change divine predestination. Such, it is said, was the opinion of the Egyptians, who believed they could ward off by sacrifices and prayers the divine decrees which they called destiny. But it is opposed to the authority of Holy Scripture; for it is said (1 Sam 15, 29 Vg): “The Glory of Israel will not forgive; repentance will not bend him”, and again (Rm 11:29): “The gifts and the call of God are without repentance. ”
We must therefore express ourselves differently and say that in predestination there are two things: divine preordination, and its effect. As for the first, predestination is in no way influenced by the prayers of the saints; for it is not through the prayers of the saints that anyone is predestined by God. But as to the second, it may be said that predestination is aided by the prayers of the saints and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not eliminate secondary causes; it provides for its effects in such a way that even the order of secondary causes is subject to this providence. Therefore, just as natural effects are organized in such a way that natural causes are ordered there, because without them these effects would not occur; likewise a man's salvation is predestined by God in such a way that the plan of predestination encompasses everything that promotes man's salvation: his own prayers, or those of others, or other good works without which he does not obtain salvation. It is therefore necessary that the predestined strive to act well and to pray, since it is by this means that the effect of predestination is realized with certainty. This is what makes St. Peter say (2 Pt 1:10): “Apply to ensure your vocation and your election through your good works. ”
Solutions:
l. This argument shows that predestination is not aided by the prayers of the saints regarding foreordination.
2 . We can be helped by another in two ways. We can receive from him an increase in active virtue, and to be helped in this way denotes weakness, and cannot suit God. It is in this sense that it is said: “Who has helped the Spirit of the Lord? ” But we can be helped by someone who carries out the action we have designed, just as the master is helped by his servant. In this way God is helped by us, when we carry out what he has decided, according to these words of the Apostle (1 Cor 3:9): “We are God's co-workers. ”And this does not come from a deficiency in divine power, but it is God who wants to use intermediate causes in order to preserve in things the beauty of order, and also in order to communicate to creatures the dignity of 'be causes.
3. The secondary causes cannot escape the order of the First Cause, which is universal, as said above. But they carry out this order. This is why predestination can be aided by creatures, while it cannot be prevented.